08-01789-cgm Doc 12318-2 Filed 12/24/15 Entered 12/24/15 00:40:36 Exhibit 11-20 Pg 1 of 67

## REPLY EXHIBIT 11

Page 1

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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In Re:

BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT Adv.Pro.No.

SECURITIES LLC,

08-01789 (BRL)

Debtor.

IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC,

Plaintiff, Adv.Pro.No.

09-1182 (BRL)

v.

J. EZRA MERKIN, GABRIEL CAPITAL, L.P., ARIEL FUND LTD., ASCOT PARTNERS, L.P., GABRIEL CAPITAL CORPORATION,

Defendants.

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VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF J. EZRA MERKIN, as reported by Nancy C. Bendish, Certified Court Reporter, RMR, CRR, and Notary Public of the State of New York, at the offices of Baker Hostetler, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York, on Tuesday, February 24, 2015, commencing at 9:47 a.m.

Picard v. Merkin

J. Ezra Merkin 2-24-15

	aru v. merkin		J. DZI a WICIKIII Z-Z-1-1-
	Pag	re 2	Page 4
1	APPEARANCES:	1	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Good morning,
2	BAKER HOSTETLER, LLP	2	we're on the record. The time on the monitor is
3	45 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10111	3	9:47 a.m. Today is the 24th day of February,
4	BY: DAVID J. SHEEHAN, ESQ.	4	2015. We are here at 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New
5	BRIAN W. SONG, ESQ. For Irving H. Picard, Trustee	5	York, New York for the purpose of taking the
6		6	videotaped deposition of Mr. Ezra Merkin in re
7	DECHERT, LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas	7	Picard versus Merkin.
,	New York, New York 10036-6797	8	Videographer is James Soto, the
8	BY: NEIL A. STEINER, ESQ. DAPHNE HA, ESQ.	9	court reporter is Nancy Bendish, both of Bendish
9	For Gabriel Capital Corp. and J. Ezra Merkin	10	*
10		11	Reporting.
11	NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP	- 1	Will all counsel please announce
12	666 Fifth Avenue	12	your appearances for the record.
13	New York, New York 10103-3198 BY: JUDITH A. ARCHER, ESQ.	13	MR. STEINER: Neil Steiner with
1,4	JAMI MILLS VIBBERT, ESQ.	14	Ms. Daphne Ha from Dechert representing
14 15	For Ascot Partners LP	15	Mr. Merkin and Gabriel Capital Corporation.
16	REED SMITH LLP 599 Lexington Avenue	16	MS. ARCHER: Judith Archer from
	New York, New York 10022	17	Norton Rose Fulbright. With me is Jami Vibbert
17	BY: JORDAN W. SIEV, ESQ.  JAMES C. McCARROLL, ESQ.	18	and Ralph Dawson. Norton Rose Fulbright
18	NICOLE LAPSATIS, ESQ.	19	represents Mr. Dawson as the receiver of Ascot
19	For Gabriel, LP and Ariel Fund, LP	20	Partners LP.
20 21	ALSO PRESENT:  DAPT M. SCHWARTZ, Paggiver for Hadge Funds	21	MR. McCARROLL: James McCarroll of
	BART M. SCHWARTZ, Receiver for Hedge Funds RALPH DAWSON	22	Reed Smith LLP. With me is my partner Jordan
22	OLEG BITMAN, Baker Hostetler JIM SOTO, Videographer	23	Siev. We represent Bart Schwartz, who is with
23 24	Jili 5010, Videographor	24	me to my left, who is the court appointed
		25	receiver for Ariel Fund Limited and Gabriel
25			
25	Pag	re 3	Page 5
		re 3	Page 5
1	INDEX	1	Capital LP.
	INDEX	1 2	Capital LP. MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is
1 2 3	INDEX	1 2 3	Capital LP. MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is also from our firm.
1 2	I N D E X WITNESS PAGE  J. EZRA MERKIN	1 2 3 4	Capital LP.  MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is also from our firm.  MS. ARCHER: Let me note for the
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7	I N D E X WITNESS PAGE  J. EZRA MERKIN	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Capital LP.  MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is also from our firm.  MS. ARCHER: Let me note for the record Norton Rose Fulbright also represents Ascot Funds Limited.  MR. SHEEHAN: David Sheehan with
1 2 3 4 5 6	I N D E X WITNESS PAGE  J. EZRA MERKIN Examination by Mr. Sheehan5	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Capital LP.  MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is also from our firm.  MS. ARCHER: Let me note for the record Norton Rose Fulbright also represents Ascot Funds Limited.  MR. SHEEHAN: David Sheehan with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	INDEX WITNESS PAGE  J. EZRA MERKIN  Examination by Mr. Sheehan5  EXHIBITS  IDENT. DESCRIPTION PAGE  Trustee 353 Document entitled "Gabriel	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	Capital LP.  MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is also from our firm.  MS. ARCHER: Let me note for the record Norton Rose Fulbright also represents Ascot Funds Limited.  MR. SHEEHAN: David Sheehan with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.  MR. SONG: Brian Song with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.
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123 4 5678 9 011 123 145678 9 21223	INDEX WITNESS PAGE  J. EZRA MERKIN  Examination by Mr. Sheehan	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Capital LP.  MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is also from our firm.  MS. ARCHER: Let me note for the record Norton Rose Fulbright also represents Ascot Funds Limited.  MR. SHEEHAN: David Sheehan with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.  MR. SONG: Brian Song with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.  MR. SHEEHAN: And with us is  MR. SHEEHAN: Oleg Bitman also for the Trustee.  J. E Z R A M E R K I N, affirmed.  EXAMINATION BY MR. SHEEHAN:  Q. Good morning, Mr. Merkin.  A. Good morning.  Q. My name is David Sheehan, as I just announced a moment ago, and I represent the Trustee this morning in the matter that is pending between the Trustee and yourself and
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 6 1 8 9 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	INDEX WITNESS PAGE  J. EZRA MERKIN  Examination by Mr. Sheehan	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 21 22 23	Capital LP.  MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is also from our firm.  MS. ARCHER: Let me note for the record Norton Rose Fulbright also represents Ascot Funds Limited.  MR. SHEEHAN: David Sheehan with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.  MR. SONG: Brian Song with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.  MR. SHEEHAN: And with us is  MR. BITMAN: Oleg Bitman also for the Trustee.  J. E Z R A M E R K I N, affirmed.  EXAMINATION BY MR. SHEEHAN:  Q. Good morning, Mr. Merkin.  A. Good morning.  Q. My name is David Sheehan, as I just announced a moment ago, and I represent the Trustee this morning in the matter that is pending between the Trustee and yourself and other defendants who are represented here today.
123 4 5678 9 011 123 145678901223	INDEX WITNESS PAGE  J. EZRA MERKIN  Examination by Mr. Sheehan	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Capital LP.  MR. SIEV: And Nicole Lapsatis is also from our firm.  MS. ARCHER: Let me note for the record Norton Rose Fulbright also represents Ascot Funds Limited.  MR. SHEEHAN: David Sheehan with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.  MR. SONG: Brian Song with Baker Hostetler for the Trustee.  MR. SHEEHAN: And with us is  MR. SHEEHAN: Oleg Bitman also for the Trustee.  J. E Z R A M E R K I N, affirmed.  EXAMINATION BY MR. SHEEHAN:  Q. Good morning, Mr. Merkin.  A. Good morning.  Q. My name is David Sheehan, as I just announced a moment ago, and I represent the Trustee this morning in the matter that is pending between the Trustee and yourself and

examined.

#### Page 172 Page 170 1 1 So you think a red flag means a I was never a market making A. A. 2 2 customer. risk factor? 3 Q. Do you know whether it 3 Q. Yes. 4 4 Okay, fine. self-cleared? A. 5 5 All right. So, would you -- how Α. So I don't know. 6 do you view self-clearing that, in terms of a You don't know. Q. 7 7 risk factor? A. Or if I knew, if I knew, I don't 8 8 Normally speaking? Look, I had remember. accounts with persons who self -- with firms who 9 Well, when he told you he 9 Q. 0 self-cleared at the investment advisory end, was 10 self-cleared for a long time. If you go back long enough, many more people self-cleared until 11 that a red flag to you? 1 clearing was made part of the industry. 12 MR. STEINER: Objection to form. 12 13 MR. SIEV: Objection to form. 13 So clearing, which relates a 4 Q. They're objecting because I didn't little bit to who has custody, presuming the 14 ask what a red flag is, so let's do that. clearing broker has custody, is one of the 5 15 I'm sorry? 16 attributes that we didn't speak about all that 6 A. 7 They didn't like me using red 17 much in terms of prime broker, but when earlier Q. you had asked me what a prime broker is and I 8 flag. So let me ask you this. 18 A. You just lost me for a second. said there's many many -- there's several 19 19 I know. It's a lawyer thing, they 20 20 different attributes to them, custody is also 21 call it foundation, whatever. You know what I 21 something that a prime broker has. 22 was talking about but the record doesn't. In 22 Right. O. any event --23 So, one might think of somebody 23 24 A. In the meantime you lost me, and 24 who is a custodian as a prime broker by virtue not them. You really lost me. 25 5 of that alone. Page 171 Page 173 1 They're with me, they're having a 1 Q. Right. Q. good time. 2 2 A. To this day, I sort of said this earlier, if you have an account at Goldman 3 Anyway, the bottom line is this. 3 Do you know what a red flag is in terms of in Sachs, the one I was referring to, this 4 4 5 5 the investment advisory business, a red flag? hypothetical account this morning, you're gonna MR. SIEV: Objection to the form. clear at Goldman Sachs. If you have an account 6 6 A. I'm not sure exactly what you 7 7 at Merrill Lynch, you're going to clear at mean, but I take you to mean some sort of a 8 8 Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch is not in the 9 9 business of giving the profitable clearing part caution. of their business away to Goldman Sachs, or vice 10 0 O. Okay. Well, I don't want you to take that from my question. I'm asking you 11 versa. I don't say that with encyclopedic 1 independently of me saying that, does the term knowledge, but that's not the way the business 12 12 "red flag" mean anything to you? 13 13 works. A. Let me just be, perhaps, a little 4 14 In Mr. Madoff's case, it was very bit clearer. I'm not sure whether by red flag 15 clear, he made very clear that the accounts were 5 you mean something that would be an absolute 16 maintained at his shop and the confirmations and 6 17 17 the monthlies that you received were on his bar --18 8 letterhead. By letterhead I don't mean an 8-1/2 Q. No. 9 19 by 11 letter, but the tickets had his firm on A. -- or something that would be a caution. That's what I was getting at. 20 them. Q. Let me rephrase it then. That's a 21 21 That seemed to me to be a risk 22 very good point. 22 factor to be weighed, but it was inconceivable Something that would expose 23 to me that somebody who had his prominence both 23 something as a risk factor that needed to be 24 within the industry, to some extent his

legendary status in the industry, the sheer

	Page 17	4	Page 176
1	volume of business he did on the wholesale side,	1	A. Um-hum.
2	that was always of interest to me.	2	Q. Does Merrill Lynch clear trades?
3	These Fidelity and Charles Schwab	3	A. Does Merrill Lynch clear some
4	orders are sought after. They are the staff of	4	trades?
5	life to people who handle their business. And	5	Q. Yes.
6	Madoff was, I spoke to somebody at Fidelity,	6	A. I would imagine so.
7	that's what I mean as a customer at this time,	7	Q. Do you have any knowledge that
8	and got back very positive review, all part of	8	they clear trades?
9	the due diligence process.	9	A. I believe they do.
lo	I spoke to investors of his,	10	Q. And they were cleared do you
1	clients of his as distinct from customers.	11	know what the term "introducing broker" means?
2	Clients on the market-making side at that time,	12	A. Not very precisely, no.
3	who I think are some of the single most able	13	Q. Do you know if introducing broker
4	people I've met in the investment business,	14	clears trades?
5	still think so. I still think that about some	15	A. I don't know the answer is I'm
6	of these people. And, you know, they all had	16	not sure.
7	very positive things to say.	17	Q. When the person who clears the
8	Q. Do you know if Mr. Madoff paid for	18	trade like Merrill Lynch is clearing trades
9	order flow?	19	for Madoff, let's assume that he was clearing
0	A. Pay for order flow was a subject	20	his trades through Merrill Lynch, right?
1	of his over a number of years. It subsided over	21	A. I don't think he did.
2	time. The whole I'm moving ahead in time	22	Q. No, no, but I'm asking you to
3	frame, so if that's not where you want to go	23	assume that he did.
4	Q. At the time you're doing your due	24	A. Okay.
5	diligence here?	25	Q. You would know, would you not,
1			
	Page 17	5	Page 177
1	Page 17 A. Initially.	1	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch
2	<ul><li>A. Initially.</li><li>Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at</li></ul>	1 2	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they
2	A. Initially. Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at that time that perhaps one of the reasons he had	1	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they had that stock, would you not?
2 3 4	A. Initially. Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at that time that perhaps one of the reasons he had the clients he did is because he paid for order	1 2 3 4	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they had that stock, would you not?  A. I just don't follow. You're
2 3 4 5	A. Initially. Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at that time that perhaps one of the reasons he had the clients he did is because he paid for order flow?	1 2 3	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they had that stock, would you not?  A. I just don't follow. You're saying now that I got a, let's say a monthly
2 3 4 5 6	A. Initially. Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at that time that perhaps one of the reasons he had the clients he did is because he paid for order flow?  A. I don't remember whether it came	1 2 3 4	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they had that stock, would you not?  A. I just don't follow. You're saying now that I got a, let's say a monthly statement from Merrill Lynch that Bernard L.
2 3 4 5 6 7	A. Initially. Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at that time that perhaps one of the reasons he had the clients he did is because he paid for order flow? A. I don't remember whether it came up in the first meeting or two or not. I just	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they had that stock, would you not?  A. I just don't follow. You're saying now that I got a, let's say a monthly statement from Merrill Lynch that Bernard L. Madoff had bought a hundred shares from me and
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	A. Initially. Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at that time that perhaps one of the reasons he had the clients he did is because he paid for order flow?  A. I don't remember whether it came up in the first meeting or two or not. I just don't remember.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they had that stock, would you not?  A. I just don't follow. You're saying now that I got a, let's say a monthly statement from Merrill Lynch that Bernard L. Madoff had bought a hundred shares from me and that was held at Merrill?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A. Initially. Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at that time that perhaps one of the reasons he had the clients he did is because he paid for order flow?  A. I don't remember whether it came up in the first meeting or two or not. I just don't remember.  Q. Did you subsequently learn that he	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they had that stock, would you not?  A. I just don't follow. You're saying now that I got a, let's say a monthly statement from Merrill Lynch that Bernard L. Madoff had bought a hundred shares from me and that was held at Merrill?  Q. Yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	A. Initially. Q. Yeah, initially. Did you know at that time that perhaps one of the reasons he had the clients he did is because he paid for order flow? A. I don't remember whether it came up in the first meeting or two or not. I just don't remember. Q. Did you subsequently learn that he paid for order flow?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that when you got a statement from Merrill Lynch that they held a certain stock long that they had that stock, would you not?  A. I just don't follow. You're saying now that I got a, let's say a monthly statement from Merrill Lynch that Bernard L. Madoff had bought a hundred shares from me and that was held at Merrill?  Q. Yes.  A. I just don't see the nexus to
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is what did you understand him to be doing? Was he buying at one time during the day or several times throughout the day?

A. I certainly didn't think he was only buying one time during the day and -although he may have. I'm sort of not sure what several means. But he could have been buying over the course of a day in more than one trade. And he didn't have to do the entire position in one day and he didn't have to do the entire position at all.

We could be -- I mean, if this is important I should just mention it. We sometimes caught a turn with one-third in and two-thirds out or two-thirds in and one-third out.

Q. Right.

A. So, again, I'm not sure that's what you mean by time slicing, but we didn't always get all in. We could be partially in and we didn't get in all in on one trade and we didn't necessarily get all in on one day.

The one trade per day, we saw things at the end of the day, but the different, the trading on different trade dates is

think it is. There's thousands and thousands of stocks. He started with a buy list that could only be a hundred. Of that he did as many as half of them.

So, he just wasn't that much of a -- there's only so many choices he had. He was basically doing a form of market timing that was nuanced by that fifth or 50 that he picked relative to trading restrictions and vis-a-vis options.

In many ways he was -- well, do I think that's true? I'll think about it.

- Q. Is there a reason he would pick stocks as opposed to just trading the entire index? If you know.
- A. Well, we talked about that before. When you say trading the entire index, you mean buying the index or buying every stock in the index?
  - Q. Let's try with buying the index.
- I'm not sure what -- this was in A. the end an arbitrage strategy.
  - Right. Q.
- A. In many ways any options arbitrage strategy. If he had every single stock in the

Page 203

something you might have seen pretty quickly.

- Does the phrase the 12-minute rule mean anything to you?
  - The 12-minute rule? A.
  - Q. Yes.
- It seems to have come up in Α. conversations. I don't place it exactly when and where.
- Q. Okay. I think we can place it later, so let's pass on that for now.
  - Okay. A.
- Q. Very simple question: Do you know if Mr. Madoff picked stocks?
- Well, there came a time, as persons of your profession like to say, that the trading director came into place and he had to pick stocks in compliance with the trading director. And before that in compliance with the basic overall strategies he and I discussed it many, many many times.

So for starters, he was picking stocks that were in the S & P 100. He was picking perhaps as many as half of them. So, you know, there are -- I can't remember exactly but I think well over 3,000 listed stocks, I

index pegged precisely correctly calibrated to exactly its component in the index, then you're long the index. Then you have a perfect hedge. And then you have reduced risk to a level that, you know, an informal and by no means exhaustively correct but nonetheless handy definition of a perfect hedge is, you're gonna make whatever the risk-free money market rate of return gives you. You've got to take risks to make money.

Q. Of course.

So if he owned every single security, unless -- unless he bought them, you know, over different periods of time, different days, weighted them differently against the basket, I mean, you have to do something.

Q. Would that have been -- well, let me rephrase this. Withdrawn. I'm not going to ask.

What impact, if any, Mr. Merkin, did Mr. Madoff's ability to perform executions impact his strategy?

A. His ability to execute impacted his strategy?

Q. Yeah. 52 (Pages 202 to 205)

some of the Russian restructures, sovereign debt restructures.    1	Pic	card v. Merkin	11-20	Pg 7 c	of 67	J. Ezra Merkin 2-24-15
2 I think—let's put it this way, 3 to the extent that I can make some sense of 4 this—I don't really—if we discussed— 5 Madoff was, was, I don't think Madoff failed to 6 answer too many questions certainly that I put 10 to him. 8 Where he would say that's—that 11 proprietary is what you called the algorithm. 12 training people—he used to say, I'm not that 13 interested in training people in Madoff. And by 14 that he meant to say, in the algorithm. In 15 other words, this is the thing that we do that 16 we think is proprietary, it comes out of the 17 totality of what we spend on the computer 18 systems and the order flow and it lets us judge 19 these turns. That was something that he would 20 answer and consider proprietary. 21 So I'm just guessing—doesn't 22 even relate to this, so I don't know. I've 23 spent five minutes looking at this document, I wouldn't put this at the top of the list is 24 wouldn't put this at the top of the list is 25 page 307 26 crowded with other things that are just 26 according to the computer of the document for a minute. 27 You know, did you ever have a 28 concern, from a scalability standpoint, of the 29 ability of Merkin to—Merkin—Mr. Madoff to purchase options consistent with the strategy? 30			Pa	ge 306		Page 308
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19  23 A. Mr. Madoff and I certainly 24 discussed that over time and he certainly made						•
. 23 A. Mr. Madoff and I certainly 24 discussed that over time and he certainly made						MR. STEINER: Objection to form.
				4	7	
				4	2	A Mr Modoff and Loomainte
				2	1	
				2	5	clear that an ever evolving higher percentage of

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		Page 310		Page 312
1 2 3 4 5	his options executions were unlisted rather listed. And that that number could be a verlarge percentage and a very large number options.  Q. Where would unlisted options be	ery of	1 2 3 4 5	derivative.  Q. Are you saying there are trillions of dollars in options?  A. I'm saying we don't know or I don't know what the total market is in options.
6 7 8 9	available?  A. When you say where?  Q. In other words, I can go to the CBOE and buy an option, right?  A. Well, if you buy, if I understand		6 7 8 9	I'm saying a derivative market as a whole is hundreds of trillions and whether there are and hundreds and hundreds and hundreds. There was just an article not such a long time ago and not in this time period. I mean
11 12 13 14 15	you, if you buy an option on the CBOE that be what I would call a listed option and it would be it would be CBOE cleared.  Q. Right. So I'm asking now, you're not buying a listed option. You're buying	at would	11 12 13 14	Q. Right. A 2014, let's say, or maybe '13, but probably not recent enough to be '15. One of the European regulators, I think The Bank of International Settlements, tries to guess at the
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 19 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	unlisted option.  A. Okay. Q. Where do you go to buy it? A. Broadly speaking, I mean, it's not a physical location. It's not a floor.	: : t	16 17 18 19	size of some of these markets and says it's guessing conservatively and it's just that much bigger and there's this ongoing regulatory effort to have players in that market bring their derivatives at least into more reportable
21 22 23 24 25	Q. I understand that. A. I wasn't sure what you meant about the where. It is in the virtual maybe virtual is not the right word. It's in the derivative marketplace.	out :	21 22 23 24 25	forms so that the world knows what it's about.  Q. I understand A. This is clearly the market that I think Bernie meant he was trading these options in. Finding them and buying them.
		Page 311		Page 313
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Q. Okay. A. You're buying derivatives. You buying non-exchange listed options that bargaining for, contracting for and closin selling. Q. Who makes a market in those? A. There are you know, this is o of the lessons of '08 and one of the great today, which is we don't really know. This is a little bit too broad because there mig some people, there surely are some people know about this than I do, but the size of market is, you know, starts at trillions and goes bigger and bigger and bigger. This market that, just to take an example, that know, Buffett has continues less stronthan he did, but has been warning about when a crisis comes it will be because of derivative marketplace. Because the words.	u're you are ng,  ne fears he "we" ght be le that is the is the gly that f the	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. But that's a different market than the one you just described? A. What is the "this"? Q. The one you described is derivative is in a broad sense, credit default swaps, everything that's involved A. Swaps, derivatives, options. Q. What I'm talking about is a very limited thing. I'm talking about somebody who's going to be in the S & P 100 stocks. A. On the index. That's what I thought you meant. Q. Exactly. And you're saying there's trillions of dollars of those options out there? A. I'm saying there could be and I don't really know how large the size is. But I think you there's something in your question
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	derivative marketplace. Because the wo brings so much of its business in the derivative as a general term here?  A. Not sure what you mean by a general term. I mean what you are buying derivative as a general term.	ivative	19 20 21 22 23 24	I don't totally follow, I think.  If you're not buying these options CBOE listed, I think we agree that you're buying them as a derivative.  Q. You're calling it that, I did not. Why are you calling it a derivative?  A. Because I think that's what it is.

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**J. Ezra Merkin 2-24-15** Page 314 Page 316 1 1 Relationship, I've got the bold You want to call it a swap, that's okay too, A. 2 2 although I think from an accounting point of word, okay. 3 view I think it's actually sometimes called a 3 Q. I actually just want not even to ask you whether you said these things but if any derivative, from a formal accounting point of 4 of them are even true. Can I ask you, for view. And I'm not remotely the last word on 5 6 formal accounting definitions. 6 example, the relationship that says that Bernie was the executor of Ezra's father's will. Is 7 But there's an enormous 7 8 marketplace in derivatives. Not only do we not 8 that correct? 9 know how big it is, we don't know what all the 9 A. No. Nor did I say it. 0 instruments are. 10 O. Ezra's brother and brother-in-law worked for Madoff? 11 1 So a credit default swap would O. 12 also be a derivative? 12 Α. No. 13 13 Did you say that? A. Certainly might be, sure. O. Right. But I'm not talking about 14 To tell you the truth, now that I 4 all derivatives, I'm talking about only one. see this -- I haven't seen this before. It is 5 15 I'm not suggesting it's not a derivative in a 16 true that Ezra's brother and brother-in-law were 6 classic sense, but the marketplace derivatives 17 the executives of Ezra's father's will, as well 7 for -- now we're only talking S & P 100 stocks 8 18 as Ezra. But my brother and brother-in-law were and we're talking a collar here for those where the executives of my father's will and my mother 19 20 was alive then. When was this? Anyway, they 20 we're selling --A. The same options we were 21 21 were the executives of my mother's estate as 22 describing earlier. 22 well. 23 Right. We've been describing. 23 Q. 24 Are you saying, I'll ask you one more time, that 24 A. So how garbled -- I can't really that marketplace is in the trillions? tell you why who was the executor of my father's 5 25 Page 317 Page 315 1 MR. STEINER: Object to the form. 1 will would have come up, but my brother and A. It depends what you're measuring 2 brother-in-law were, and this is partly what I 2 with the use of the word "trillions." Are you mean when I suggested telephone conversations 3 3 don't unroll these ways and I read this for two talking about -- I mean, these are complex 4 4 things that also have technical pieces to them. 5 5 minutes and I didn't finish the whole thing, but Are you talking about notional, 6 6 doesn't look to me like somebody took very good are you talking about actual, are you talking 7 7 notes and it looked to me like somebody tidied 8 about total amount of capital hedged. But could 8 up a lot of things for a neat presentation. 9 they be in the trillions? Do we know, could 9 MR. SHEEHAN: Well, I am done for 0 there have been the volume available for this in 10 today. 1 the derivative marketplace? Absolutely. 11 THE WITNESS: Okay. Q. Did you ever, yourself, on behalf 12 12 MR. SHEEHAN: Thank you. of yourself or any of your funds, trade in 13 13 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the record 4 unlisted options? 14 6:16. 5 A. I don't remember. We certainly 15 (Deposition adjourned.) 6 -000could have. 16 7 Q. Okay. The other thing about 17 8 options -- well, no, I already asked that. I 18 apologize. One second. 19 A. Sure. 20 Q. I want to ask you some questions 21

22

23

24

with regard to -- it's page -- well, doesn't

one. Where it says, the bold word is

"relationship."

seem right here, but anyway, CON 0000060. This

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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In Re:

BERNARD L. MADOFF INVESTMENT Adv.Pro.No.

SECURITIES LLC,

08-01789 (BRL)

Debtor.

IRVING H. PICARD, Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC,

Plaintiff, Adv.Pro.No.

09-1182 (BRL)

v.

J. EZRA MERKIN, GABRIEL CAPITAL, L.P., ARIEL FUND LTD., ASCOT PARTNERS, L.P., GABRIEL CAPITAL CORPORATION,

Defendants.

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CONTINUED VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITION OF

J. EZRA MERKIN, as reported by Nancy C. Bendish, Certified Court Reporter, RMR, CRR, and Notary Public of the State of New York, at the offices of Baker Hostetler, 45 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York, on Wednesday, February 25, 2015, commencing at 9:42 a.m.

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		Page	322		Page 324
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	A P P E A R A N C E S:  BAKER HOSTETLER, LLP 45 Rockefeller Plaza New York, New York 10111 BY: BRIAN W. SONG, ESQ. LAN HOANG, ESQ. For Irving H. Picard, Trustee  DECHERT, LLP 1095 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10036-6797 BY: NEIL A. STEINER, ESQ. MARIEL BRONEN, ESQ. For Gabriel Capital Corp. and J. Ezra Merkin  NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP 666 Fifth Avenue New York, New York 10103-3198 BY: JUDITH A. ARCHER, ESQ. JAMI MILLS VIBBERT, ESQ. For Ascot Partners LP  REED SMITH LLP 599 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10022 BY: JORDAN W. SIEV, ESQ. NICOLE LAPSATIS, ESQ. For Gabriel, LP and Ariel Fund, LP	Page	11 11 11 11 11 11 11	3 4 5 6 7	
20 21 22 23 24 25	ALSO PRESENT:  BART M. SCHWARTZ, Receiver for Hedge Funds RALPH DAWSON OLEG BITMAN, Baker Hostetler JIM SOTO, Videographer	Page	2 2 2 2 2 2	0 1 2 3 4 5	Page 325
1	INDEX			1	THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Good morning,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	J. EZRA MERKIN  Examination by Mr. Song5  E X H I B I T S IDENT. DESCRIPTION PAGE  Trustee 364 Document entitled "Gabriel Capital Group, December 2005, "BS00038683-697326  Trustee 365 Documents BS00306002-006351  Trustee 366 Documents BS00305716-723351		1 1 1 1 1 1	3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7	we're on the record, 9:42.  J. E Z R A M E R K I N, previously affirmed.  EXAMINATION BY MR. SONG:  Q. Good morning, Mr. Merkin.  A. Good morning.  MR. STEINER: Brian, before we start, I did want to put on the record that our understanding of the rules is that you get one examiner per witness and Mr. Sheehan started taking this deposition yesterday and our view is that he should be the one who's here completing it. We understand you disagree, we don't think that that's what the rules provide, but we are interested in finishing this deposition so we can complete discovery and move forward with the case, and so, you know, subject to just noting
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	Trustee 367 Transcription of Audio File 158.mp3484 Trustee 368 Transcription of Audio File bd.mp3484  Trustee 369 Transcription of Audio File 1bf.mp3484 Trustee 370 Email, UBPAMMERKIN000000045 Trustee 371 Email, GCC-P 0152946527 Trustee 372 Email, GCC-P 0479368586	527	1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2	8 9 0 1 2 3	our objection, start with your questions.  MR. SONG: Okay.  BY MR. SONG:  Q. Good morning, Mr. Merkin. We met yesterday. I'm Brian Song, I'm an attorney for the Trustee and I will be continuing your examination today. My apologies that Mr. Sheehan is unavailable today as he is in

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	Page 47	4	Page 476
1	if you remember we looked yesterday at those	1	Q. And again I think you
2	declining returns, in one of the chart	2	A. I meant to say ADV. That last
3		3	line again is scalability issue.
4	presentations, those green lines that went down		•
	over a decent period of years, but still	4	Q. Can you turn to page 367, which is
5	acceptable, so that you could begin to come to a	5	the fourth page of this document.
6	conclusion that he's learned how to scale his	6	A. Yes.
7	business.	7	Q. The top of 367 is actually a
8	Q. Did Mr. Madoff ever express to you	8	continuation of comments made by Mr. Madoff,
9	that there was a limit to the assets under	9	starting on 366, but what I want to direct your
10	management that he could take for his strategy?	10	attention to
11	A. He certainly expressed that at any	11	A. This is a good illustration of why
12	given time he was not interested in giving an	12	it's hard to take notes.
13	additional capacity. He would turn down	13	Q. I want to direct your attention at
14	additional capacity routinely or postpone it.	14	the top of 367 there's a reference to, says
15	That certainly conveyed the notion that he was	15	Goldman Sachs, for example, does an almost
16	capacity sensitive, capacity possibly	16	identical type of arbitrage strategy. Do you
17	constrained. He did not convey a single digit	17	see that?
18	to me and say this is what I can manage, I	18	A. Yes.
19	cannot manage a penny more.	19	Q. Do you recall Mr. Madoff talking
20	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	20	to you about an arbitrage strategy that Goldman
21	of the limits of what Mr. Madoff's scalability	21 22	Sachs also had at that point in time?
22	would be?		A. I'm not sure I remember that
23	A. In absolute dollars?	23	exactly today, but I'm sure this is what was
24	Q. Yes.	24	said. I don't think anybody is making up this
25	A. I didn't it's not the way I	25	troncornt
7—	71. I didn't it's not the way I	23	transcript.
	Page 47		Page 477
	Page 47		Page 477
1	Page 47 would have thought of it or not the way I would	1	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at
1 2	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so	1 2	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage
1 2 3	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so I was acutely aware that	1 2 3	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?
1 2 3 4	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing	1 2 3 4	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy?
1 2 3 4 5	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the	1 2 3 4 5	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes.
1 2 3 4 5 6	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as	1 2 3 4 5 6	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at
1 2 3 4 5 6 7	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as either making exceptions, as we saw earlier, and	1 2 3 4 5 6 7	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at Goldman Sachs over the years, so many years
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as either making exceptions, as we saw earlier, and as occasionally having, in a different part of	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at Goldman Sachs over the years, so many years about so many different things. Not that I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that  Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as either making exceptions, as we saw earlier, and as occasionally having, in a different part of his book, redemptions.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at Goldman Sachs over the years, so many years about so many different things. Not that I remember.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as either making exceptions, as we saw earlier, and as occasionally having, in a different part of his book, redemptions.  Q. Okay. The last E on this page? A. The last E? Q. The last E, where you talk about, I couldn't tell you if I'm one of your top 10 clients, top 20, top 50, top five. See that?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at Goldman Sachs over the years, so many years about so many different things. Not that I remember.  Q. Do you see Mr. Madoff is claiming that Goldman Sachs is well, he says if I'm making 14 or 13 percent in some quarters, they're probably coming in at nine percent. Do you see that?
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 6 7 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 6 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as either making exceptions, as we saw earlier, and as occasionally having, in a different part of his book, redemptions.  Q. Okay. The last E on this page? A. The last E? Q. The last E, where you talk about, I couldn't tell you if I'm one of your top 10 clients, top 20, top 50, top five. See that? A. No oh, yes. Here it is. Fine. Q. Did you have an understanding as to how many clients Mr. Madoff had in the	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at Goldman Sachs over the years, so many years about so many different things. Not that I remember.  Q. Do you see Mr. Madoff is claiming that Goldman Sachs is well, he says if I'm making 14 or 13 percent in some quarters, they're probably coming in at nine percent. Do you see that?  A. I see that. He's not saying it's the same. He's saying it's almost identical. Q. Right. Do you have an
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 6 7 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 5 6 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7 1 7	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as either making exceptions, as we saw earlier, and as occasionally having, in a different part of his book, redemptions.  Q. Okay. The last E on this page? A. The last E? Q. The last E, where you talk about, I couldn't tell you if I'm one of your top 10 clients, top 20, top 50, top five. See that? A. No oh, yes. Here it is. Fine. Q. Did you have an understanding as to how many clients Mr. Madoff had in the	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at Goldman Sachs over the years, so many years about so many different things. Not that I remember.  Q. Do you see Mr. Madoff is claiming that Goldman Sachs is well, he says if I'm making 14 or 13 percent in some quarters, they're probably coming in at nine percent. Do you see that?  A. I see that. He's not saying it's the same. He's saying it's almost identical. Q. Right. Do you have an
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12345678901234567890123	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as either making exceptions, as we saw earlier, and as occasionally having, in a different part of his book, redemptions.  Q. Okay. The last E on this page? A. The last E? Q. The last E, where you talk about, I couldn't tell you if I'm one of your top 10 clients, top 20, top 50, top five. See that? A. No oh, yes. Here it is. Fine. Q. Did you have an understanding as to how many clients Mr. Madoff had in the investment advisory business at this point in time?  A. I don't remember any understanding at that time. Q. Did you ever have an understanding?	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at Goldman Sachs over the years, so many years about so many different things. Not that I remember.  Q. Do you see Mr. Madoff is claiming that Goldman Sachs is well, he says if I'm making 14 or 13 percent in some quarters, they're probably coming in at nine percent. Do you see that?  A. I see that. He's not saying it's the same. He's saying it's almost identical. Q. Right. Do you have an understanding as to why Goldman Sachs would be less successful at the strategy than Mr. Madoff?  A. Well, he says you won't hear about it, you won't know about it, because they're not telling you about it, which goes to what I knew or didn't know about the Goldman Sachs. But I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 1 2 3 4 1 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 2 2 2 2 2 2	would have thought of it or not the way I would have expressed it, so  I was acutely aware that Mr. Madoff was not interested in managing additional money at many points in the relationship, and explained himself to me as either making exceptions, as we saw earlier, and as occasionally having, in a different part of his book, redemptions.  Q. Okay. The last E on this page? A. The last E? Q. The last E, where you talk about, I couldn't tell you if I'm one of your top 10 clients, top 20, top 50, top five. See that? A. No oh, yes. Here it is. Fine. Q. Did you have an understanding as to how many clients Mr. Madoff had in the investment advisory business at this point in time?  A. I don't remember any understanding at that time. Q. Did you ever have an	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 9 20 21 22 3	Q. Did you ever speak to anybody at Goldman Sachs regarding their arbitrage strategy?  A. Their arbitrage strategy? Q. Yes. A. God, I spoke to so many people at Goldman Sachs over the years, so many years about so many different things. Not that I remember. Q. Do you see Mr. Madoff is claiming that Goldman Sachs is well, he says if I'm making 14 or 13 percent in some quarters, they're probably coming in at nine percent. Do you see that? A. I see that. He's not saying it's the same. He's saying it's almost identical. Q. Right. Do you have an understanding as to why Goldman Sachs would be less successful at the strategy than Mr. Madoff? A. Well, he says you won't hear about it, you won't know about it, because they're not telling you about it, which goes to what I knew

08-01789-cgm Doc 12318-2 Filed 12/24/15 Entered 12/24/15 00:40:36 Exhibit 11-20 Pg 13 of 67

## REPLY EXHIBIT 12

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                 IN THE MATTER OF
3
         MADOFF CHARITIES INVESTIGATION
4
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6
                                 120 Broadway
                                 New York, New York
7
                                 January 30, 2009
8
                                 10:02 a.m.
9
10
                  EXAMINATION UNDER OATH of J.
11
       EZRA MERKIN, pursuant to Subpoena, held at
       the above place, date and time, before
12
       Alice Schulman, a Notary Public of the
13
14
       State of New York.
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VERITEXT REPORTING COMPANY

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                New York, New York
6
      BY:
                ANDREW J. LEVANDER, ESQ.,
7
                NEIL STEINER, ESQ., and
8
                SARA MENDOLA, ESQ.
9
10
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11
      OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
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                120 Broadway - 23rd Floor
                New York, New York 10271-0332
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      BY:
14
                Bureau Chief
                Investor Protection Bureau
15
                ERIC CORNGOLD, ESQ.,
16
                Executive Deputy AG for
                Economic Justice
17
                JASON R. LILIEN, ESQ.
18
                Bureau Chief Charities Bureau
19
                DANIEL SANGEAP, AAG
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                HARRIET ROSEN, AAG
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#### J. E. Merkin

document beyond any conversations with me.

There were investors who came into Ascot looking for Madoff and saying this is what we want, and so I'm not sure that it was necessarily the first leg of the conversation was a disclosure for me.

There were investors who came in looking for Ascot and ran out and got a conversation perhaps about the strategy and didn't necessarily get a full conversation about Bernie's role, but they certainly had the documents.

And depending upon how many questions were asked and depending on how long the conversation was, I pretty much had a practice of making sure they understood that the strategies were executed through Madoff.

- Q. Now, with respect to Ramaz, did you disclose to Ramaz that you had an affiliation with Madoff?
- A. I did that, I think, in the context that is relatively unimportant.

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# REPLY EXHIBIT 13

### 08-01789-cgm Doc 12318-2 Filed 12/24/15 Entered 12/24/15 00:40:36 Exhibit 11-20 Pg 18 of 67

From: Autera, Michael

Sent: Tue, 30 Oct 2007 11:14:15

GMT

To: 'Renee Nadler'

Subject: RE: Quick Question from Tufts

Historically, the non-Madoff strategies have represented less than 5% of Ascot's gross exposure. The exposure in 2007 has been less than 5% as well.

From: Renee Nadler [mailto:rnadler@invoff.trustees.tufts.edu]

Sent: Monday, October 29, 2007 4:45 PM

To: Autera, Michael

Subject: RE: Quick Question from Tufts

Hi Mike

Nice to see you when we were in NY last week. A quick follow up question for you:

Ezra mentioned that a portion of Ascot is being managed internally with LEAPs and other option strategies. Could you let me know what % of capital is allocated to positions beyond the capital allocated to the Madoff team. (I don't need a precise number, just trying to get a sense of what it has been on average in 2007 and how that compares to other years.)

Thanks!

Renee

Renee Nadler, CFA
Director of Investments
Tufts University
151 Merrimac Street, Suite 600
Boston, MA
02114

617-627-3491 (tel) 617-627-6754 (fax) RNadler@invoff.trustees.tufts.edu (e-mail)

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## REPLY EXHIBIT 14

#### YESHIVA UNIVERSITY

TO: Mr. Robert Beren

DATE:

October 28, 1993

Mr. Ludwig Bravmann

Mr. David S. Gottesman

Mr. Gedale Horowitz

Mr. J. Ezra Merkin

FROM: Sheldon E. Socol

SUBJECT: Board of Trustees Investment Committee

Meeting October 27, 1993

While I will, of course, prepare full Minutes of our meeting of October 27, I thought it advisable to summarize the decisions that were reached. Please advise if any corrections or modifications are appropriate.

- 1. On January 1, \$20.0 million dollars to be invested with Odyssey Partners (a 10.0 million dollar increase over the previously approved 10.0 million dollar figure).
- As soon as possible, increase the funds invested with Ardsley (including current market value) to a total of 15.0 million dollars to be managed by Philip Hempelman.
- As soon as possible, invest 5.0 million dollars with Ardsley Pacific to be managed by David Gong.
- As soon as possible, increase the funds invested with Ascott (including current market value) to a total of 20.0 million dollars to be managed by Bernard Madoff.
- Increase, as soon as possible, the funds invested with Kingdon (including current market value) to a total of 10.0 million dollars.
- Decide by November 30 if the funds now invested in the J Fund (Jerry Jordon) should be withdrawn.
  - A. Interview Martin Zweig to determine if 10.0 million dollars should be invested with him for management.
  - B. Interview Merriweather (John Hildebrand) to determine if an investment should be made and, if so, the amount of such investment.

Mr. Merkin will attempt to schedule these two interviews for November 18.

7.

8. If the Board of Trustees Real Estate Committee approves of the transaction, some 7.0 million dollars can be invested in the purchase of a 7%, 20.0 million dollar mortgage note of Francis Greenburger relating to his leasehold on 55 Fifth Avenue to be sold by the FDIC on behalf of Dollar Dry Dock Savings back during a November 10 auction. Annual return is some 1.5 million dollars or 100% of cash flow, whichever is higher.

SES:ajs

cc: Ms. Navah Levine

Mr. Bernard Pittinsky

Mr. Jack Sproule

#### 1998 CONFLICT OF INTEREST REPORT TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES **MARCH 1999**

During the 1998 calendar year, the University "did business" with the following firms and companies in which one or more members of the Board had or have a financial interest. In each instance the business relationship was based upon a proven track record, the reputation of the firm or individuals involved, demonstrated experience and competence, and/or the result of competitive bids.

When applicable, such as the selection of investment mangers, where the Board Investment Committee made and approved the decisions the appropriate Board committee was involved. In all cases, the fees charged were equal to and in many instances less than the industry standard.

#### Philip Altheim

Forest Electric Corp. was the electrical sub-contractor Vice Chairman, Board of Overseers selected by Knightsbridge Construction Company in connection with the renovation of the 11th floor of the Brookdale Center for the Cardozo School of Law. The Forest Electric sub-contract totaled \$275,000 of the \$1.5 million Knightsbridge contract for the 11th

#### Leon Black

Member of the Cardozo Board

30.0 million dollar investment committed for management to the Apollo Investment Fund of which only 6.5 million was under management in 1998 resulting in a management fee of \$33,000.

#### <u>Judah Feinerman</u> RIETS Board Chairman

Member of Board of Trustees

Judd Associates, Insurance broker. Total policy premiums \$38,000.

#### Morris Green

Vice Chairman - RIETS Board Member of Board of Trustees

Total payments in 1998 totaled \$103,000 as rental payments for apartments used by students in a Washington Heights (480 W. 187th Street) building in which Mr. Green has a financial interest.

In prior years the University had provided capital as an investor to acquire this building which has since been repaid.

#### Samuel H. Lindenbaum

Honorary member-Board of Overseers

## J. Ezra Merkin Member RIETS Board Chairman-Board of Trustees Investment Committee

Rosenman & Colin.

Represents the Institution as special land use counsel. Total fee paid in 1998 was \$14,000.

General or Managing Partner or Chairman or Co-Manager of four (4) of the 24 investments classified by the Investment Committee as hedge funds, hedge investments or non-readily marketable investments.

#### Total University Funds Managed

Blackacre Long Horizon

11.2 Million Dollars
19.3 Million Dollars

ABLECO Ascot Partners 8.5 Million Dollars 45.5 Million Dollars

84.5 Million Dollars

Management fees paid in 1998 totaled \$824,200 including \$430,000 paid for funds in Ascot Partners which are essentially managed by Bernard Madoff, a member of the Board of Trustees. Incentive fees based upon 1998 performance totaled an additional \$601,454.

Each fund identified generated each year, to date, a net profit for the University and the University has never experienced a loss on these investments.

It should also be noted that one of Mr. Merkin's Co-Managers on the ABLECO fund is the General Manager of Cerberus which manages 15.0 million dollars of University funds.

### Ira M. Milistein Vice Chairman - Board of Overseers

Partner Weil Gotshał & Manges LP Represents the University in regard to many matters. Ira Millstein has never charged the University for the considerable personal time he devotes to University issues. Total fees paid to the firm was \$251,000 in 1998 primarily for real estate matters, but includes other matters and litigation.

#### Richard Parkoff

Member Yeshiva College Board

Total rental payments of \$724,000 were made in 1998 to The Parkoff Organization as rental payments for apartments used by students in seven (7) Washington Heights buildings in which The Parkoff Organization has a financial interest. In prior years mortgage financing was provided by the University to acquire these buildings under favorable terms in consideration of benefits granted to the University such as assuring access to all vacant apartments. The mortgage on several of these buildings is not at this time current, however, due to inadequate cash flow.

#### Philip Rosen

Vice Chairman - Yeshiva College Board

Partner, Weil Gotshal & Manges LP Represents the University in regard to various real estate matters. Total fees paid to the firm in 1998 totaled \$251,000 (see note above in regard to Ira Millstein).

### Howard J. Rubenstein

Member Board of Overseers -

Howard J. Rubenstein Associates. Firm retained annually to assist the Institution with special public relations problems and projects. Total annual payment \$32,000.

#### Stephen B. Slegel Member Cardozo Board

President and CEO Insignia/Edward S. Gordon Co. Payment of commission in 1998 of \$752,000 in connection with the sale of 425 Fifth Avenue.

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TOTAL P.04

Minutes of a regular meeting of the Board of Trustees of Yeshiva University held pursuant to notice at the Midtown Campus, 245 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York at 4:30 p.m. on Tuesday, March 13, 2001.

Present:

Robert M. Beren, Chairman

Jack A. Belz
Julius Berman
Ludwig Bravmann
J. Morton Davis
David Eshaghian
Judd Feinerman
Dr. Felix L. Glaubach
Dr. Jacob E. Goldman

E. Billi Ivry
Michael Jesselson
Marcos Katz
Mordecai D. Katz

Dr. Ira Kukin
Dr. Norman Lamm
Earle I. Mack
Burton P. Resnick
David I. Schachne
Michael Scharf
Ronald P. Stanton
Moshael J. Straus, Esq.

Sy Syms Morry Weiss Joseph Wilf David Yagoda

#### Also present:

Martin H. Bockstein, Esq. General Counsel

Dr. Herbert Dobrinsky
Vice President for University Affairs

Peter Ferrera
Director, Department of Communications and Public Affairs

Daniel T. Forman
Vice President for Development

Dr. Morton Lowengrub
Vice President for Academic Affairs

Dr. Sheldon E. Socol Vice President for Business Affairs and Secretary

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Mr. Beren called the meeting to order and welcomed all present. He noted that this was the first meeting of the Board to be held in the Gottesman Board Room and he called attention to the picture of the three generations of Gottesman family members on the wall of the Board Room.

The Chairman called for approval of the minutes of the Board meeting of November 14th, 2000. On motion duly made and seconded the minutes were approved.

Mr. Beren then referred to the previously distributed list of his recommendations for membership on the Committees of the Board of Trustees through the period ending September 30, 2001. A copy of the recommended nominees is attached. A motion was made to approve the recommended nominees. The motion was seconded and unanimously passed.

The Chairman then called upon Mr. Bravmann to give the report of the Nominating Committee. Mr. Bravmann said that the Nominating Committee had submitted to the Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee had unanimously approved the nominations of Dr. Iayne G. Beker, Chairman of the Ferkauf Graduate School of Psychology, and Marjorie Diener-Blenden, Chairman of the Stern College Board, for membership on the Board of Trustees for a two year term. The nominees were approved by the Board. Final action is deferred until the next meeting of the Board of Trustees in accordance with the By-laws.

The Chairman then called upon Dr. Morton Lowengrub. Dr. Lowenbrub reported that the search is continuing for Deans of the Azrieli, Sy Syms, and Cardozo Schools. Dr. Lowengrub has interviewed candidates and has made recommendations to Dr. Lamm.

Mr. Resnick then reported on the proposed amendments to the By-laws. He called on Martin Bockstein to discuss the proposed amendments, which had previously been unanimously approved by the Executive Committee and recommended by it to the Board of Trustees.

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Following a discussion, the proposed By-laws amendments were, on motion duly made and seconded, unanimously approved. The amendments will be submitted to the next meeting of the Board of Trustees in accordance with the By-laws.

Mr. Beren, noting the large attendance at this meeting, said that it is a tribute to Dr. Lamm on his 25th year as President.

The Chairman then called upon Mr. Stanton for a report on the Capital Campaign. Mr. Stanton said that the campaign has raised \$212 million through February 2001. This total includes the new Michael Price pledge of \$25 million to name The Center for Genetic and Translational Medicine. Many people were involved in numerous meetings to secure this gift including Dean Purpura, Ira Millstein, Burt Resnick, Einstein faculty members, Dr. Socol, and other staff. Mr. Price also retained assistance from Philanthropic Initiatives, a philanthropic consultant group in Boston who represented his interests.

The model of trustees and current supporters identifying new friends will be critical to our Capital Campaign success in future years. Mr. Stanton urged each Board member to identify three potential new major supporters in the belief that we will achieve success with one of the three.

Our Capital Campaign launch will take place on May 23 at the New-York Historical Society.

We are on target in announcing that ten families have committed pledges of \$10 million dollars and over. We are also on target in announcing that an additional ten families have committed gifts of \$5-\$10 million and an additional thirty families have committed gifts of between \$1 and \$5 million.

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In regard to the Price gift, it was pointed out that it is a matching grant. \$25 million dollars has been pledged on condition that the AECOM Board raises an additional \$35 million. There are other specific conditions.

Mr. Beren then introduced Mr. Julius Berman, the Chairman of the RIETS Board of Trustees, who is attending his first meeting of the YU Board of Trustees.

Mr. Beren then called upon Mr. Bravmann for the Investment Committee report.

Mr. Bravmann made reference to a performance summary sheet including asset allocations as of December 31, 2000 which he briefly updated. As at January 31, 2001, the market value of our endowment fund was \$862.1 million. This compares favorably to the \$777 million market value one year earlier. The \$85.1 million endowment increase consists of \$19.3 million in new gifts and \$65.8 million in realized and unrealized appreciation.

During the calendar year 2000, despite difficult market conditions our total assets under management earned 11.6%, net of all fees. We manage most fixed income assets internally with other investments managed externally. In 2000 our external managers earned an impressive 13.6% net of fees total return and our internally managed fixed income assets earned an equally impressive 8.4% for a weighted average of 11.6% compared to a negative 9.1% for the S&P 500 index and a negative 4.7% for the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

These figures are subject to year-end audit adjustments and include unrealized returns.

Mr. Mack asked Dr. Socol about the University's investment portfolio. Dr. Socol said that it had very limited exposure to high tech equities. He said its allocation was 37.91% in fixed income investments and 61.50% in equities, hedge funds and alternative investments.

The Chairman then called upon Mr. Mack for the Government Relations Committee

Report. Mr. Mack said that it is important to have a presence in Washington to avail ourselves of

4

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Federal Grants. He said that President Lamm had convened a meeting of Messrs. Resnick, Mack and Eric Javits, who considered several representatives who could represent the University's interests in Washington. Two were decided upon, one to cover the House and the second for the Senate. They will be seeking programmatic grants. For AECOM, funding would be sought for the magnetic resonance imaging facility and for Cardozo, for its Innocence Project. The groups selected were those of Bob Livingston at the House level and Alfonse D'Amato's firm for Senate representation.

The Chairman then called upon Dr. Socol for the Conflict of Interest report. Dr. Socol distributed the annual report of all members of all University Boards who do business with the University. The names of all such Board members are annually disclosed with the nature and the amount of business done with the University. A copy of the year 2000 Conflict of Interest Report is attached to these minutes.

Mr. Stanton recommended that people on the YU payroll who consult with companies that the University does business with should also be listed in the Conflict of Interest Statement.

Dr. Socol said that those names will be included in future reports.

The Chairman then called upon Dr. Norman Lamm. Dr. Lamm, speaking about the Capital Campaign, said that we need the Board's help in reaching the goals of the campaign.

The President said that when the Executive Committee had authorized the Dormitory Authority borrowing, it did so conscious of the importance of prudence in incurring debt.

Dr. Lamm said that achieving diversity in staffing and enrollment sometimes creates concerns as does providing educational opportunities for the disabled. He said there are both moral and statutory considerations that must be taken into account. In addition, both are driven by accrediting agencies and applicable law. He recommended the appointment of a committee to

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establish a University-wide policy for dealing with such issues.

Dr. Lamm then presented the following recommendations for recipients of Honorary

Degrees: Richard C. Holbrooke, Rabbi Ephraim Buchwald, Arthur Cohn and Eli Zborowski. A

discussion followed concerning the recommendations. Thereafter a motion to approve the

recommendations was seconded and unanimously adopted.

Dr. Lamm then recalled for the Board a conversation he had had with his revered predecessor, Dr. Samuel Belkin, 25 years ago, after Dr. Belkin had retired. Dr. Lamm described how Dr. Belkin had told him of the rigors of the Presidency and what Dr. Lamm could expect, including the unexpected. Dr. Lamm said that the past 25 years have been the most invigorating of his life.

With that background, Dr. Lamm said, he now officially informs the Board that he will leave the Presidency of Yeshiva University and of RIETS in August 2002, in sixteen months. He said that he hoped that a successor could be found within that time but that he would, of course, stay on until that was accomplished.

President and brilliant Rosh Hayeshiva." He said that his initial reaction to Dr. Lamm's news was one of sadness but that was tempered by the contemplation of so much achievement. Dr. Lamm's career covers over 60 years. Mr. Beren said that we are grateful that Dr. Lamm has pledged his continuing involvement with the University. He said that he would, later this evening, address the President's specific, enormous accomplishments. Mr. Beren said that Dr. Lamm is the recognized world leader of modern orthodoxy who responded to the challenges of his office with dignity and intelligence. Morry Weiss took the floor on behalf of Mr. Gottesman, who was absent, and reiterated Mr. Beren's sentiments and remarks. He said that Dr. Lamm's tenure has

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been a fabulous period for the University due to his presence.

In recognition of Dr. Lamm's enormous accomplishments, a motion was made that Yeshiva University establish the position of Chancellor and that it be assumed by Dr. Lamm on the final day of his presidency. The motion was unanimously carried.

The Chairman then recognized, in turn, the following Board members, each of whom expressed their appreciation to Dr. Lamm for his abilities and accomplishments: Messrs. Yagoda, Berman, Feinerman, Scharf, Belz, Davis, Ms. Ivry and Drs. Goldman and Kukin.

Following the remarks, Dr. Lamm briefly took the floor again to thank all those who spoke so warmly in tribute to him. Dr. Lamm then presented the tenure recommendations that had been approved by the Executive Committee. The proposal was to award tenure to Nancy Carrasco, M.D. Thierry LeJemtel, M.D., Steven Schwartz, M.D. and Mark Chance, Ph.D. The candidates' CV's were previously distributed to the Board members. Following a discussion, the Board unanimously voted to award tenure to the candidates conditioned upon tenure recommendations being approved for them by the Board of Overseers of the Albert Einstein College of Medicine when it next meets.

Mr. Beren then said that he will announce a search committee for Dr. Lamm's successor in the near future. The meeting was then adjourned to be followed by a dinner at the Schottenstein Residence Hall in honor of Dr. Lamm.

MARTIN H. BOCKSTEIN

#### 2000 CONFLICT OF INTEREST REPORT TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES MARCH 2001

During the 2000 calendar year, the University "did business" with the following firms and companies in which one or more members of the Board had or have a financial interest. In each instance the business relationship was based upon a proven track record, the reputation of the firm or individuals involved, demonstrated experience and competence, and/or the result of competitive bids.

When applicable, such as the selection of investment managers, where the Board Investment Committee made and approved the decisions the appropriate Board committee was involved. In all cases, the fees charged were equal to and in many instances less than the industry standard.

#### Philip Altheim

Vice Chairman, Board of Overseers

Forest Electric Corp. installed two (2) 1500 KVA replacement transformers at 2495 Amsterdam Avenue. The total payment was \$275,000.

#### Leon Black

Member, Cardozo Board

\$45.0 million University investment committed for management to the Apollo Investment Funds. \$24.5 million book value, \$30.2 million market value as of December 31, 2000 was under management in 2000. resulting in a management fee of \$400,400.

#### Judah Feinerman

Member, Board of Trustees Member, RIETS Board

Judd Associates/ C.S.I.R. Inc. Enterprises Insurance broker. Total policy premiums \$366,000.

#### Elliot Feinerman

Member, Yeshiva College Board

#### Samuel H. Lindenbaum

Honorary Member, Board of Overseers

#### J. Ezra Merkin

Member, RIETS Board Chairman, Board of Trustees Investment Committee Rosenman & Colin.

Represents the Institution in an estate administration proceeding. Total fee paid in 2000 was \$134,179.

General or Managing Partner or Chairman or Co-Manager of four (4) of the 32 investments classified by the Investment Committee as hedge funds, hedge investments or non-readily marketable investments.

### Total University Funds Managed (Market Value at December 31, 2000)

Blackacre	15.7	Million Dollars
Long Horizon	26.1	Million Dollars
ABLECO	10.0	Million Dollars
Ascot Partners	<u>61.6</u>	Million Dollars
	113.4	Million Dollars

Management fees paid in 2000 totaled \$1,090,000 including \$593,000 paid for funds in Ascot Partners which are essentially managed by Bernard Madoff, a member of the Board of Trustees. Incentive fees based upon 2000 performance totaled an additional \$537,824.

Each fund identified generated each year, to date, a net profit for the University and the University has never experienced a loss on these investments.

It should also be noted that one of Mr. Merkin's Co-Managers on the ABLECO and Blackacre funds is the General Manager of Cerberus which manages 6.4 million dollars of University funds. Ira M. Millstein

Vice Chairman, Board of Overseers

Marvin E. Jacob

Member, RIETS Board

J. Philip Rosen

Vice Chairman, Yeshiva College Board

A. Richard Parkoff

Member, Yeshiva College Board

go Uswel Tevace

Howard J. Rubenstein
Member, Board of Overseers

<u>Charles A. Krasne</u> Member, Board of Overseers Partners Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP
Represent the University in regard to many
matters. Ira Millstein has never charged the
University for the considerable personal time he
devotes to University issues. Total fees paid to the
firm was \$670,905 in 2000 primarily for real estate
matters, but includes other matters and litigation.
In addition, The Midtown Centre LLC, a limited
liability company established to purchase and
operate property at 205/215 Lexington Avenue
paid legal fees of \$529,436 during 2000.

Total rental payments of \$\tilde{\tau}, \quad \tau \text{were made in 2000 to The Parkoff Organization as rental payments for apartments used by students in \( \subseteq \text{\tau} \) Washington Heights buildings in which The Parkoff Organization has a financial interest. In prior years mortgage financing was provided by the University to acquire these buildings under favorable terms in consideration of benefits granted to the University such as assuring access to all vacant apartments. The mortgage on several of these buildings is not at this time current, however, due to inadequate cash flow.

Howard J. Rubenstein Associates. Firm retained annually to assist the Institution with special public relations problems and projects. Total annual payment \$86,323 in 2000.

Krasdale Foods, Inc.

Total paid to the company was \$47,874 in 2000 for University cafeteria food purchases.

John D. Cohen

Member, Board of Overseers

Blank Rome Tenzer Greenblatt

Total fees paid to the firm was \$41,801.25 in 2000 primarily for real estate matters, but includes other

matters and litigation.

Emanuel J. Adler

Member, Yeshiva College Board

Empire Blue Cross / Blue Shield

\$12,792,213

Dr. Michael A. Stocker

Member, Board of Overseers

Stephen J. Schulte Schulte Roth & Zabel

Total fees paid to the firm was \$1,433 in 2000

related to a former employee labor matter.

Member, Cardozo Board

Robert I. Kantowitz

Member, Yeshiva College Board

Chase Securities, Inc.

The University utilizes this organization to sell various bonds received from gifts and estates.

Alan M. Silberstein

Member, Sy Syms Board

Western Union Financial Services \$1,868 was paid to this company in 2000 for various mailing services.

Moses Marx

Member, RIETS Board

The Berkshire Bank

In 2000 the University used Madison Merchant Services, a subsidiary of The Berkshire Bank, to process its MasterCard and VISA payment transactions. Approximately \$16.0 million of transactions were processed, generating \$351,000 in fees.

#### **AGENDA**

#### YESHIVA UNIVERSITY

#### BOARD OF TRUSTEES MEETING

TUESDAY - MARCH 12, 2002

MID-TOWN CAMPUS

#### GOTTESMAN BOARD ROOM

7<sup>TH</sup> FLOOR

4:00 P.M.

Robert M. Beren - Presiding

I.	Welcome Approval of Minutes - November 27, 2001	Chairman
П.	President's Report Including appointments of Dr. David Schnall and Dr. Charles Snow	Dr. Norman Lamm
ш.	Committee Reports	
	<ul> <li>a. Capital Campaign Committee</li> <li>b. Gift Acceptance Committee</li> <li>c. Investment Committee</li> <li>d. Academic Affairs Committee</li> <li>e. Presidential Search Committee</li> <li>f. Finance Committee</li> <li>g. Nominating Committee - Board of Trustees</li> <li>h. By-Laws Committee</li> </ul>	Ronald P. Stanton Daniel T. Forman Chairman Ludwig Bravmann Dr. Ira Kukin Michael Jesselson Burton P. Resnick Ludwig Bravmann Martin Bockstein, Esq.
IV.	Report on Legal Affairs	Dr. Sheldon E. Socol Martin Bockstein, Esq.
V.	Annual Report on Conflict of Interest	Dr. Sheldon E. Socol
VI.	Discussion  - Albert Einstein College of Medicine  - Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law	

#### 2001 CONFLICT OF INTEREST REPORT TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES MARCH 2002

puring the 2001 calendar year, the University "did business" with the following firms and companies in which one or more members of the Board or members of Board Committees are either employed by or had / or have a financial interest. In each instance the business relationship was based upon a proven track record, the reputation of the firm or individuals involved, demonstrated experience and competence, and/or the result of competitive bids.

Where investment managers are committee members, the Board Investment Committee approved the allocation of funds for management. In all cases, the fees charged were not more than the industry standard.

While not a condition of the business relationship often the Board member is a substantial

#### Hyman Arbesfeld

Member, RIETS Board

Hotel Bedford

San Carlos Hotel

The Hotel Bedford was paid \$64,712 in 2001 and \$64,666 in 2000. 1 \$485 was paid to the San Carlos Hotel, \$4,802 was paid in 2000.

#### eon Black

Member, Cardozo Board

pollo Investment Funds

0 million investment committed for management to the Apoilo Investment Funds of Wijch \$29.2 million of book value, \$32.7 million of market value was under management in resulting in a management fee of \$474,900.

#### ohn D. Cohen

Member, Board of Overseers

#### Emanuel J. Adler

Member, Yeshiva College Board

#### Mank Rome Tenzer Greenblatt LLP

lotal fees paid to the firm was \$27,060 in 2001 primarily for real estate matters, but includes other matters and litigation.

### dEshaghian

ber, Board of Trustees 10 and the entire building at 205 Lexington Avenue for \$29.25 million. The Twestry and Mr. Eshaghian share management of the common elements of the 215 Avenue condominium with a common operating budget of some \$1.0 million.

## ្រៅងក៏ Feinerman

Elliot Feinerman

pmber, Board of Trustees

Member, Yeshiva College Board

ember, RIETS Board

ridiassociates/ C.S.I.R. Inc. Enterprises

surance broker. Total policy premiums \$234,406.

#### www.d Jonas

amber, Yeshiva College Board Tinternet Services Inc. ្រៀមពីversity paid \$3,388 in 2001.

### bert I. Kantowitz

lember, Yeshiva College Board

hase Securities, Inc.

ne University utilizes this organization to sell various securities received as gifts or from sales. Total fees paid in 2001 was de minimus.

#### charles A. Krasne

lember, Board of Overseers

lasdale Foods, Inc.

paid to the company was \$38,276 in 2001 for University cafeteria food purchases.

#### tedda Leff

ember, Wurzweiler Board

icoln Electric Products Company

business with this company in 2001 was almost \$60,000.

#### Moses Marx

Member, RIETS Board

The Berkshire Bank

In 2001 the University used Madison Merchant Services, a subsidiary of The Berkshire Bank, to process its MasterCard and VISA payment transactions. Approximately \$7.5 million of transactions were processed, generating \$158,000 in fees to Madison Merchant Services.

#### J. Ezra Merkin

Member, RIETS Board Chairman, Board of Trustees

Investment Committee

General or Managing Partner of the following four (4) investments of the thirty-nine (39) such investments classified by the Investment Committee as hedge funds, hedge investments or non-readily marketable investments.

Market Value at	Decembe	er 31, 2001	Management Fee	High Water Mark	Incentive Fee
Blackacre	\$16.5	Million	1%	Yes	20%
Leong Horizon	\$29.2	Million	1%	Yes	20% (in excess of 10%)
ABLECO	\$10.9	Million	1%	No	20%
Ascot Partners	\$69.3	Million	. 1%	No	None
en en de la companya	\$125.9	Million		•	••

Jine 39 investments had a market value of \$634.5 million with the four (4) Merkin managed funds representing some 19.84% of this type of investment. The total funds under management as at December 31 was \$1.3 billion. Each Merkin managed fund generated each year; to date, a net profit for the University.

Management and incentive fees paid in 2001 totaled \$1,680,786 including \$663,000 paid for funds in Ascot Partners which is managed by Bernard Madoff Investment Securities in accordance with an arrangement made directly with Ascot Partners. Mr. Bernard Madoff is al Member. Board of Trustees and Chairman, Sy Syms Board of Directors.

Ill should also be noted that Steve Fineberg, one of Mr. Merkin's Co-Managers on the ABLECO Blackacre and Long Horizon funds is the General Manager of Cerberus which manages \$7.2 million of University funds and received \$224,949 as management and incentive fees in 2001.

Ira M. Millstein Vice Chairman, Board of Overseers Marvin E. Jacob Member, RIETS Board

J. Philip Rosen Vice Chairman, Yeshiva College Board

Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP A law firm representing the University in regard to many matters. Ira Millstein, who has retired from the management of the firm, has never charged the University for the considerable personal time he devotes to University issues. Total fees paid to the firm was \$237,582 in 2001 primarily for real estate matters, but includes other matters and litigation.

A. Richard Parkoff

Member, Yeshiva College Board

The Parkoff Organization Total rental payments of \$936,299 were made in 2001 to The Parkoff Organization as rental. payments for fifty-seven (57) apartments used by or held vacant for the University in seven (7) Washington Heights buildings in which The Parkoff Organization has a financial interest. In prior years, mortgage financing and investments were provided by the University to acquire ten (10) buildings under favorable terms in consideration of benefits granted to the University such as assuring access to all vacant apartments. The mortgage on several of these buildings is not at this time current, however, due to inadequate cash flow. As of June 30, 2001, there are outstanding mortgages and investments in nine (9) buildings totaling \$4,415,000. The interest in arrears is \$1,821,000.

Howard J. Rubenstein

Member, Board of Overseers

Howard J. Rubenstein Associates

Firm retained annually to assist the Institution with special public relations problems and projects. Total annual payment \$82,753 in 2001.

Stephen J. Schulte

Member, Cardozo Board

Schulte Roth & Zabel

Total fees paid to the firm was \$972 in 2001 related to a former employee labor matter.

#### Stephen Siegel

Member, Cardozo Board Insignia/E.S.G. Real Estate

in 2001, \$16,959 was paid for real estate related services for 205/215 Lexington Avenue and for year 2000, \$730,000 was paid for real estate commissions in connection with real estate transactions.

## Dr. Michael A. Stocker

Member, Board of Overseers

CEO of Empire Blue Cross / Blue Shield which provides basic health insurance for members of the University, faculty, staff and student body. Total premium remitted was \$11,694,060.

Minutes of a regular meeting of the Board of Trustees of Yeshiva University held pursuant to notice at the Midtown Campus, Gottesman Board Room, 245 Lexington Avenue, New York, New York at 4:00 p.m. on Tuesday, March 12, 2002.

Present:

Robert M. Beren, Chairman

Jack Belz\*
Julius Berman
Marvin S. Bienenfeld
Marjorie Diener Blenden
Ludwig Bravmann
David Eshaghian
Judd Feinerman
Dr. Felix L. Glaubach
Alan E. Goldberg
David S. Gottesman
Michael Jesselson
Mordecai D. Katz

Dr. Ira Kukin
Dr. Norman Lamm
Earle I. Mack
Burton P. Resnick
David I. Schachne
Irwin Shapiro
Ronald P. Stanton
Moshael Straus, Esq.

Sy Syms Morry Weiss Joseph Wilf David Yagoda

Also present:

Martin H. Bockstein, Esq. General Counsel

Dr. Herbert Dobrinsky
Vice President for University Affairs

Daniel T. Forman
Vice President for Development

Dr. Morton Lowengrub
Vice President for Academic Affairs

Dr. Sheldon E. Socol
Vice President for Business Affairs
and Secretary

The Chairman called the meeting to order and called for approval of the minutes of the meeting of November 27, 2001, which on motion duly made and seconded were approved.

<sup>\*</sup> By telephone

The Chairman then called upon Dr. Norman Lamm for the President's Report. Dr. Lamm thanked Joseph Wilf for his extremely generous gift naming the uptown campus. His report was greeted with applause.

The President said that the Rabbinate in Israel has asked for a day of prayer and fasting in the United States. It would be known as a "little Yom Kippur." Dr. Lamm said that the Israel situation is causing an institutional problem for YU. We do not know how many students will be returning to Israel after the break. It may create a residence hall problem.

The President said that the Jerusalem College of Technology may not be able to continue as our tenant in Israel. In that event, a new tenant or other source of income would have to be identified.

The President said that there have been three acceptances of the offer of honorary degrees: Dr. Bernadine Healy, Michael Jesselson and Mrs. Limor Livnat. They will be honored at the YU graduation.

Dr. Lamm proposed for additional honorary degrees Malcolm Hoenlein and Richard Joel.

The nominees for honorary degrees were unanimously approved.

The Chairman then called upon Michael Jesselson for a report of the Presidential Search Committee. Mr. Jesselson said that the Committee has been operating for a few months with a very short list of candidates. Dr. Zakheim recently met with several Board members and indicated that he does not want to be considered for the Presidency. Mr. Jesselson noted that no offer had been made to him.

Dr. Lamm asked the Board to approve the appointment of 2 new Deans: J. Charles Snow of the Sy Syms School of Business and David J. Schnall as the Dean of the Azrieli Graduate School of Jewish Education and Administration.

Thereafter the Board unanimously approved the appointment of the 2 Deans.

The Chair then called upon Mr. Resnick for a report of the Finance Committee. A copy of the report is attached to these minutes.

The Chair then called upon Earle Mack. Mr. Mack said that he would like to re-open discussions regarding Cardozo Law School finances in relation to the renovation project and would like to meet with the Finance Committee to insure that we can complete the renovations of the Law School building in a timely manner. He asked that construction continue until the meeting takes place.

Mr. Mack noted that the Law School would produce a "profit" after certain expenses are satisfied including debt service on the \$30 million bond issue. Mr. Resnick said that as soon as Mr. Mack was ready the Finance Committee would meet with him and other representatives of the Law School. Mr. Beren said that in view of that, action should be deferred on Mr. Mack's request that the construction at the Law School be continued until the meeting with the Finance Committee.

The Chair then called upon Mr. Stanton, who together with Dan Forman gave the Capital Campaign Report. The Report is summarized in the material included in the booklet distributed to all Board members. Mr. Forman, utilizing slides, expanded on those remarks, showing among other things, the source of the funds received so far and of the pledges.

The Chair then called on Mr. Bravmann for the report of the Investment Committee. A copy of that report is attached to these minutes.

Mr. Bravmann's report was supplemented by Dr. Socol who distributed additional charts and spoke with the aid of slides. He said that the closing market value of the endowment fund at December 31, 2001 was \$920.8 million. For the year ending on that day there was a net of fees total return of 3.7% which compares favorably with the applicable benchmarks.

Reference was made to an Executive Summary of Cambridge Associates which indicated that YU's endowment fund has performed the third best of 134 surveyed institutions for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2001. Dr. Socol thanked the Investment Committee for its diligent service.

Mr. Beren said that we are pleased with the performance on a comparative basis.

Mr. Bravmann then moved the membership on the Board of Fanya Gottesfeld-Heller whose nomination had been considered at the previous meeting of the Board and deferred to this meeting in accordance with the By-Laws. The Board unanimously approved her membership on the Board.

Mr. Bravmann also nominated J. Ezra Merkin for membership on the Board. Mr. Merkin had previously been recommended by vote of the Executive Committee. His nomination was unanimously approved and will be deferred for final action until the next succeeding meeting of the Board.

The Board then considered 2 proposed amendments to the By-Laws which had been approved at the previous meeting. The amendments relate to the creation of an Investment Committee as a Standing Committee of the Board of Trustees and the creation of the Office of

Chancellor. On motion duly made and seconded both amendments were unanimously approved and will now become part of the By-Laws.

Mr. Bravmann then proposed an amendment to the By-Laws which would eliminate deferral to a succeeding meeting of final approval of candidates for Board membership. A discussion followed. Mr. Syms asked why we are fixing something that isn't broken and pointed out that all the current members had successfully been through the existing process. Following further discussion a motion to adopt the amendment was made, seconded and approved. It will be considered at the next meeting of the Board in accordance with the By-Laws.

The Chair then called upon Dr. Kukin for the Report of the Academic Affairs Committee. Dr. Kukin said that Dr. Lowengrub had reported on academic initiatives, external departmental reviews, new faculty hires and the mentoring program being conducted by Dr. Margaret Gibelman.

Dean Gelman provided an update on the upcoming Middle States Association visit. Dr. Rosovsky reported on his review of the undergraduate colleges that had been done in 1999 at the request of Dr. Lamm and Mr. Gottesman.

A suggestion was made that the Academic Affairs Committee meet with the Middle States evaluators during their visit on March 17 - 20, 2002.

Mr. Beren then gave a report on the Gift Acceptance Committee and called attention to the guidelines of the Committee contained in the booklet distributed to members. He said that the Committee had recently acted on 3 bequests. Included are funds already received and to be received as follows: \$7 million from the Estate of Peter Benenfeld, \$10 million from the Estate of Joseph Emanuel and the magnificent bequest from the Estate of Anne Scheiber that has now

08-01789-cgm Doc 12318-2 Filed 12/24/15 Entered 12/24/15 00:40:36 Exhibit 11-20 Pg 47 of 67

grown to approximately \$40 million. Mr. Beren said that the Committee carried out the intent of the benefactors.

Mr. Bockstein and Dr. Socol then reported to the Board on pending litigation, describing the status of the Estates of Herling and Gabriel Levine. Mr. Beren reported on the pending litigation involving the Harry Beren Trust D in which Yeshiva University is one of 9 charities named as preferred beneficiaries.

Dr. Socol then gave the Annual Conflict of Interest Report with supporting data previously distributed to the Board. He noted that the Board's policy requires full disclosure of the nature and extent of any business done between members of the various Boards of the University and the University. A list with details of such transactions had been distributed. Dr. Socol noted that most of such business is done on a competitive bidding basis and that the University usually receives preferential treatment, to its benefit. Mr. Beren questioned the Board on whether it had any objections to any of the transactions. No member expressed any opposition.

Dr. Socol then reported on the Prudential demutualization. He said that YU pension participants have approximately \$800 million invested with Prudential constituting the assets of its basic pension plan. The University has engaged Buck Associates to consult and advise on the most equitable way to distribute the approximately \$307 million that Prudential will distribute to the University for the benefit of the 6000 possible distributees. The report is expected to be received shortly.

The meeting was then adjourned.

MARTIN H. BOCKSTEIN

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# REPLY EXHIBIT 15

#### YESHIVA UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES INVESTMENT COMMITTEE

#### MR. GEDALE HOROWITE, CHAIRMAN

#### December 21, 1992

#### BETURES

A meeting of the Board of Trustees Investment Committee was held in the offices of Mr. David Gottesman at 4:00 p.m. on Monday afternoon, December 21, 1992.

Present: Mr. Robert Beren, Mr. Ludwig Bravmann, Mr. David Gottesman, Mr. Gedale Horowitz, Ms. Billi Ivry, Mr. J. Ezra Merkin, Dr. Sheldon E. Socol and Ms. Abigail Mason of Cambridge Associates.

1. The investment performance as at November 30 was reviewed for each of the fund managers:

#### • OPPENHEINER

The Committee expressed the opinion that Oppenheimer's 1992 performance was "very good". Questions were raised, however, concerning their reporting format and Dr. Socol was asked to reconcile with University records their data concerning opening fund balances and the amount of withdrawals. Dr. Socol was also asked to report at the next meeting concerning the policies and procedures applicable to "income" received by the University each year from the various fund managers.

#### NEUBERGER AND BERMAN

The Committee expressed its satisfaction of the performance of Neuberger and Berman. To assure

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performance reporting consistency of all the fund managers, Dr. Socol said that he would undertake, with the help of Cambridge Associates, to develop a more meaningful reporting format.

#### · KUROPACIFIC GROWTH FUND

while it is somewhat premature to evaluate the performance of the funds invested in the EuroPacific Growth Fund, the value of the fund did decline by approximately 2% over the previous 30 days, which today is, in view of the relatively depressed condition of the foreign markets, to be expected with global investment funds. It was decided to invite a representative of EuroPacific to attend the next meeting of the Committee.

#### · MILLER, ANDERSON & SHERRERD

The management by Miller, Anderson & Sherrerd of 30 million dollars was undertaken only within the last 30 days, no comments could, therefore, be made concerning their performance. On balance, it was noted that, to date, they appear to be investing the funds aggressively. It was pointed out, however, that while some of the investments held by MAS appear to be high coupon, high quality, others are very clearly not investment grade. It also appears that they had purchased a substantial amount of what could be called "junk" bonds and that they, at least, as of the November 30 reporting date appear to have a high cash position. Many questions were raised,

however, concerning their reporting format and the definitions they use to refer to "yield to maturity" and "current yield". The reporting format also did not provide crucial information such as the average life of the portfolio, the duration of maturities, and the yield to maturity based upon purchase cost.

The investment guidelines with Miller, Anderson & Sherrerd were reviewed by the Committee and it was suggested that the guidelines be modified to provide that investments should not be made in less than double "BB" obligations. These issues will be discussed with MAS by Cambridge Associates and a complete report will be prepared for the next meeting.

2. Dr. Socol presented a schedule identifying the assets managed by the various fund managers, which indicated that in the aggregate some 36% is now invested in equities under the assumption that the 100% equity managers have indeed invested all the assets that they manage in equities.

The non-supervised assets were identified and briefly described.

It is the objective of the Committee that ultimately all the endowed assets of the Institution should be managed under the oversight and guidelines set by of the Investment Committee and that over time those that today are being managed consistent with certain donor preferences, should be consolidated as part of the investment pool to the degree it

is practical to do so.

- 3. Dr. Socol referred to the Minutes of the December 1st meeting and said that the Committee had previously decided that after the national presidential election, subject to market conditions, an additional 30 million dollars is to be deposited for management with Miller, Anderson & Sherrerd. In view of economic conditions and the questions raised concerning their reporting format and the "quality" of the investments being made, it was decided to defer the implementation until the questions raised can be satisfactorily answered.
  - 4. Dr. Socol pointed out to the Committee that they had indicated a desire to move toward an equity asset allocation of approximately 50% and that since some 36% was now invested in equities 14% additional percent of the market value of the endowment fund can now be invested in the equity market. The Committee expressed its view that it should proceed toward a 50% equity position on a long term basis but should do so with great caution.

The Committee agreed that on a long term basis the equity market consistently outperforms the fixed income market, yet the time horizon to measure equity performance should be five years or greater.

A lengthy discussion followed concerning various investment strategies. Ms. Mason reviewed her report concerning prospective "hedge fund" managers for the Committee and pointed out the various definitions and structures under the general category of hedge funds which include varying investment styles and strategies, as well as the concerns inherent in the use of such strategies.

The Committee confirmed its prior decision not to invest funds with any individual or firm which is under any investigation "cloud", which eliminated certain possible managers. Many names, as possible investment mangers, were suggested by members of the Committee and varying investment styles and approaches were discussed in considerable detail.

Ms. Ivry raised, once again, for consideration, the possible investment in mutual funds such as the Putnam Fund. Discussion followed, and it was decided to review this matter again in the future, pointing out the advantages and disadvantages of mutual funds as compared to the other investment opportunities under consideration.

5. Mr. Ezra Nerkin, in response to the request made of him to do so during the December 1 meeting of the Committees, presented his report and analysis concerning various investment strategies and potential managers for each strategy. Consistent with the Committee's earlier decision, a plan was discussed for 25 million dollars to be so invested to be divided among six or seven managers in amounts ranging from 2.5 million dollars to 5.0 million dollars.

Mr. Merkin pointed out that the objective is to increase

return at the lowest possible risk and that on a risk adjusted basis, especially in a downward or meandering market, the type of management suggested should do better than the more traditional investment opportunities. Committee expressed its awareness of the fact that the investment approach being considered requires the recognition of certain realities. Rather than the receipt of trade notices, the University will, in their place, receive quarterly letters and reports that are often unaudited. In certain instances the University may from time to time, therefore engage an independent audit of its investment. Liquidity varies with the investment opportunity, and prior notice is required and the timing of that notice is important to assure a prompt return of principal. While communication with the fund managers of the type under discussion is certainly possible, it is not as easily achieved as with typical fund managers and the information obtained may to the unsophisticated be a source of some discomfort. The members of the Committee understood full well the characteristics of the type of investments under discussion and the names of those suggested were well known to them as was their business and professional reputation. Ms. Mason and Dr. Socol pointed out that investment in certain types of Limited Partnerships may give rise to Unrelated Business Taxable Income (UBTI).

Mr. Gottesman pointed out that it was important to select managers and investment opportunities that have proven in the past that they could stay the course since in today's highly valued market, "When you fill the bathtub, all the toys float and the problem begins when you pull the pluq.".

There was unanimous agreement, after considerable discussion and analysis, that it is in the best interest of the University to invest 25 million dollars, consistent with the plan being discussed, one that the University has sufficient endowment funds to now make it prudent to do so. It was further decided that to the degree possible, the investments should be made by December 31st since the opportunities to invest in the way proposed is limited and that the representatives of several of the desirable investment opportunities have indicated in prior conversations that only as an accommodation to the University would they be prepared to accept new "accounts" and that this offer should be accepted without delay especially since December 31 is an opportune time for such investments. It was then decided unanimously to proceed with the following investments:

A.	Madoff and Company (Ascot Partners L.P.)	\$5.0 million
В.	Ardsley Partners	\$5.0 million
c.	J Fund	\$2.5 million
D.	Kingdon Capital	\$2.5 million
B.	Pequot Partner	\$2.5 million
F.	Bentley Capital	\$2.5 million
G.	Wellington Partners	\$2.5 million
H.	Siegler-Collery	\$2.5 million
		·
Tot	al	\$25.0 million

If it proves, for whatever reason, to be impractical to place any one or more of these investments at this time, the Committee agreed that the funds are to remain uninvested until the Committee meets again and makes an alternative decision.

The Committee authorized Dr. Socol with the help of Mr. Merkin to proceed to place these investments. Mr. Merkin was thanked for his valuable assistance.

The Committee decided to meet again on Monday afternoon, January 25, 1993 at 3:30 p.m. in Mr. Gottesman's office to continue its deliberations and to receive status reports concerning the implementation of prior decisions. A representative of The Euro Pacific Growth Fund will be invited to that meeting.

.Meeting was adjourned at 7:25 p.m.

Minutes prepared

Sheldon E. Socol

YESHIVA UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENT FUND IN \$0003					JANUARY 1, 1980		
MANAGER	AVERAGE CAPITAL	MONTHLY CHANGE	Y-T-D CHANGE	CURRENT VALUE	PREVIOUS VALUE	*	
EOF CHIONSTERNOSIS		,				-	
	\$0	•		\$0	\$0	0%	
SUBSTOCKET	30			\$0	\$0	o <b>%</b>	
MARCH TO HERE WERE							
MADOFF & CO	\$5,000			\$5,000	\$5,000	20%	
She was a second	\$5,000			\$5,000	\$5,000 🖫	************	
Marie September September							
ARDSLEY PARTNERS	\$5,000 \$2,500			\$5,000 \$2,500	\$5,000 \$2,500	20%	
PECUOT PARTNERS  J. FUND	\$2,500			\$2,500 \$2,500	\$2,500	10%	
BENTLEY CAPITAL	\$2,500			\$2,500	\$2,500	10%	
St. Bulker	\$12,500			\$12,500	\$12,500 🔂	EX	
Webster bolts							
SIEGLER-COLLERY	\$2,500			\$2,500	12,500	10%	
Silingual/Version recent	\$2,500	<b></b>		\$2,500	\$2,500 🛱	2010	
V-Special Silication Sees							
KINGDON PARTNERS WELLINGTON PARTNERS	\$2,500 \$2,500			\$2,500 \$2,500	\$2,500 \$2,500	10% 10%	
SUBBIDICAGO	\$5,000		· .	\$5,000	\$5,000 🚝		
NEST CHEST PROPERTY.						•	
<del>.</del>	\$0			.\$0	\$0	0%	
SOCIONAL CONTRACTOR	\$0			\$0	,50	0%	
CASH INVESTMENTS	\$0	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		\$0	\$0	0%	
	\$25,000			\$25,000	\$25,000 🖼	211665	

Confidential Treatment Requested YU 0000732

#### YESHIVA UNIVERSITY

TO: Mr. Jack Sproule Deputy Controller DATE:

December 21, 1992

PROM:

Dr. Sheldon E. Socol

SUBJECT:

Board of Trustees Investment Committee

Vice President Business Affairs

.

Today the Board of Trustees made, among other decisions, the following investment decisions which you should act upon today:

Call:

Pequot Partners Fund L.P. Mr. Arthur Sanburg (203) 254-0091 \$2.5 million

J. Fund

Mr. David Driscoll or his secretary, Ms. Susan Lynch (617) 261-9800 \$2.5 million

Bentley Capital Mr. Jerry Levine (212) 272-9440

\$2.5 million

Advise each of them of the decision of the Investment Committee and that we want to open the account and wire the funds by December 31. Let them send the forms and information to do so right away.

You can advise that the Board Committee decision was based upon the recommendation of Mr. J. Ezra Merkin, a member of the Board. (He probably contacted them already.)

Let me know the status this afternoon.

The Minutes of the December 21 meeting will provide data concerning other investment decisions, such as the decision to invest with:

Madoff & Co. Ardsley Partners \$5.0 million \$5.0 million

Do not contact them, however, until Mr. Merkin first speaks to them.

SES:ajs

cc: Mr. Bernard Pittinsky

Confidential Treatment Requested YU 0000733

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# REPLY EXHIBIT 16

Suite 800 100 Congress Avenue Austin, Texas 78701 DALLAS HOUSTON AUSTIN LONDON WASHINGTON, D.C. WINSTEAD SECHREST & MINICK A Professional Corporation Attorneys & Counselors

(512) 474-4330 Telecopier (512) 370-2850

Direct Dia 12/370-2866

December 30, 1992

Mr. J. Ezra Merkin c/o Ascot Partners, L.P. 450 Park Avenue 32nd Floor New York, New York 10022 VIA FAX 212-838-9603 ORIGINAL BY FEDERAL EXPRESS

Re: Mary Thomajan Investment of \$750,000 Ascot Partners, L.P.

Dear Ezra:

By way of follow up to our conversation of yesterday and my telephone call this date to Michael in your office, I am faxing to you the following documents relevant to Mary Thomajan's investment of \$750,000 in Ascot Partners, L.P., with the originals being sent by Federal Express to your office tonight:

- (1) Purchaser's Statement of Suitability executed by Mary Thomajan, and wherein she has indicated that you acted as her purchaser representative. If you deem that inappropriate in light of your role as the General Partner, please advise me; otherwise, you may wish to place in her file a Purchaser Representative Statement signed by you.
- (2) Executed originals of Pages 7 and 8 of the Subscription Agreement and Power of Attorney for Ascot Partners, L.P. I would appreciate your returning to me a copy of page 8, the acknowledgment page, signed by yourself as the Managing Partner, so as to reflect the acceptance of Mary as a limited partner.

Please be advised that I have this date instructed Nations Bank in Austin, Texas to wire transfer the amount of \$750,000 to Citibank N.Y., ABA #021000089 to the account of Morgan Stanley & Company, Account #38890774, for further credit to Ascot Partners, L.P., Account #03823002. I would appreciate your office confirming receipt of these funds as soon as possible.

Mary and I look forward to working with you and Bernie Madoff as it relates to Ascot Partners, L.P. I also very much appreciate your assistance to Mary in evaluating the various investments we have been considering. I am forwarding to you copies of the letters confirming our investments of \$1,000,000 in

Mr. J. Ezra Merkin December 30, 1992 Page Two

Tremont Investors and \$750,000 in The SC Fundamental Value Fund. I am sure we will be talking during the year, and I know you are particularly busy at this time of year, and Mary really needed the help. Thanks again for your assistance and your patience.

Sincerely,

Peter Winstead

PW

cc: Ms. Mary Thomajan

Enclosures

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# REPLY EXHIBIT 17

## GABRIEL CAPITAL GROUP

1992 SEP-1 PH 12: 22

450 Park Avenue New York, New York 10022

TELEPHONE 212 838-7200 FACSIMILE 212 838-9603

TO:

Mr. Ralph Kestenbaum

011-4121-395-914

FROM:

Michael E. Autera, Jr.

DATE:

September 1, 1992

RE.:

Investment in Ascot Fund Ltd/Madoff & Co.

Per your request, the wiring instructions for Ascot Fund Ltd. are as follows:

Chemical Bank New York, New York

ABA

021-000128

CHIPS

012

A/C:

Pierson Heldring & Pierson

544-7-07901

CR.:

Ascot Fund Ltd

238336

As I mention on the phone, your investment of \$500,000 (USD) will be used to purchase participating shares of Ascot Fund Ltd. Ascot is a Cayman Island corporation whose Investment Advisor is Ezra Merkin. Ascot's sole investment is a managed account at Bernard L. Madoff & Co.

Please do not hesitate to call either Ezra or me if additional information is needed or if questions arise.

Regards,

M. FEX

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# REPLY EXHIBIT 18

From: Walter Link on behalf of wlink@bluewin.ch

Sent: Thu, 06 Nov 2008 08:21:27 GMT

To: Autera; Michael
CC: wlink@bluewin.ch
Subject: M&H Propeties LLC

#### Dear Mr. Autera,

Just in case you didn't get my e-mail address down correctly, here it is. In the future if I have questions, shall I direct myself to you or who else should I call.

For now I understand that you send me

- Month by month performance overview for 2008 and prior years
- Each month when the numbers come out an e-mail about the return for the prior month
- The redemption info. My understanding is that I need to cancel with 30 days notice for the end of the quarter
- My understanding is also that presently you are invested 100% in Madoff and that the fee is 1,5% with no further costs or deductions on the Madoff results

Thank you, Walter Link (President M&H)

Confidential GCC-P 0219384

# REPLY EXHIBIT 19 (FILED UNDER SEAL)

# REPLY EXHIBIT 20 (FILED UNDER SEAL)